What's the message in the bottle in the act of putting it in the ocean?

‘When one chooses for oneself, one chooses for everyone.’

This is the default of ‘choice’ which is based on the presumption of a conception of morality which begins from false epistemological premises to begin with. Bilgrami sites this with resorting to Mill’s argument in section III in his essay ‘Gandhi the Philosopher’.

www.ahimsaonline.org/downloads/akeel_bilgrami.pdf

Truth itself is part of an existential crisis, as Sartre would take to be the case. Being in itself is something we strive for, it is something which can never be attained. Truth, considering this, is something that cannot be attained in so long it is seen in the form of Ding en sich , the thing in itself. Kant’s epistemological premises will also hold it to be the case that it is something our faculties does not allow to investigate. Then what is the point of the Imperatives at all? What is the semantic meaning of conduct? It has none. It is the message in the bottle out at the sea, as Bilgrami assents to be the case. His idea springs from the disagreement or rather the misreading of Gandhi by Sumit Sarkar’s Modern India where it is said that ‘The search for truth was the goal of Life, and as no one could ever be sure of having attained the truth, use of violence to enforce one’s view on it is sinful.’ (I would have added the use of violence or non violence to enforce one’s view is sinful in so far both the option follow logically from the previous part of the sentence.)

He analysis Mill’s argument as follows:

Premise 1:Our past beliefs have often turned out to be false.

Premise 2: This is ground for thinking that our present opinions may be wrong.

Conclusion: We should(my emphasis) be tolerant of dissent from current option.

Premise 1 is based on Premise 2, in so far as premise 1 is based on a present judgment. Premise 2 cannot then follow from Premise 1. That is what Bilgrami pointed out. Now while that is quite alright, I want to point out that assuming that there were in fact no problem in the premises, ‘the-should’ condition in the premises cannot really follow. It entails that choice of an action is based on some understanding of the truth. It assumes what Bilgrami plans to deny as highlighted in the objectives of this essay: To deny that there is a link between moral sense and moral judgment. It confirms to Clifford’s view that actions should not be based on unjustified beliefs which in fact does not deny the correlation between moral sense and moral judgment. The link that is to be denied is that actions are based on beliefs, not that beliefs are based on actions. Bilgrami in his paper fails to see the distinction of where the two spring from and denies both, presenting a confident exemplary action in the process in section IV.

What Bilgrami finds of philosophical interest is Gandhi’s moral sense, and his denial of the assumed connection between moral sense and moral judgment. A distinction or contrast like any classification presumes the ground for classification. The ground here is of action. That’s where Moral sense springs from, be it that of Gandhi or Bilgrami or of anyone else. My point is that there can in fact be no valid grounds for anyone’s action, so the point of interpreting them to have any basis is in fact incoherent. To assume that there is a moral sense when a random action is performed is also an assumption which must be denied. I deny this assumed link. I might pick up a glass of water in a certain way, I might have a five star using a folk and a knife. It will be an action that will be seen by some, in case I do not perform it in isolation. It is one’s choice, not one’s moral choice, it yet becomes exemplary and not necessarily condescending.

I may choose to visit a sick friend, not because she is sick necessarily. She may see it as an act of affection, I may just see it as an act in retrospect. Other friends may see it as an example or as a condescending act in so far as they do not visit that friend. The act is not moral, the act is not necessarily condescending, it is an act none the less, an act one chooses to perform for oneself, yet it has various repercussion on the environment, which are just accidental at best in so far a necessity can never be granted to random acts, in so far as the one that performs such acts does not choose to set them as standards.

It’s once choice of existence, not of essence, in the world of Sartre, it is being for itself, not being in itself. In so far as it does not have an essence, it can not turn into a principle for others, even though there is no denying that it may accidentally lead others to follow that choice, solely out of interest, or boredom, or curiosity of there being an essence to it, or the moral misconception which has survived throughout the ages ‘When one chooses for oneself, one chooses for everyone.’ This is led by an adventitious phrase, ‘Do un to others as others would do un to you.’ It is something which even Sartre talks about in Existentialism and Humanism. One would think that he would be smarter. But alas! A man is a man! He strives on assumptions, on looking for the Ding en sich. He does not know how to live otherwise. Sad little man!!

The world is filled with examples, confident ones and also those which are less confident. If actions are to be chosen on the basis of those examples which conform to the fashion of blatant acceptance of ‘When one chooses for oneself, one chooses for everyone’ one must questions who decides which actions are more confident than others. Confidence of action is also a valuation, just as principles are. Confidence is an attribute of highlighting. There may be a number of similar colour balls, yet all might be different. If one glows, it would be termed special among others. That’s how I draw a distinction between things being different and things being special. Confidence in performing an action presumes a sense of assertiveness in it, which makes it special and not just different. And such an assertion either presumes some truth as its basis or alternately it is the subjectivity of the observer to choose that example to be more confident, hence more assertive, which is already decided upon based on what one really wants to do. There can be no other option. The first then is no different from the notion of principles to be followed in so far a mark of truth establishes the essence of the confidence even if it is called an example. The second conforms to Sartre’s belief that when one does seek counsel, from the mere idea then one has already made one’s choice. Then the example becomes redundant.

‘Confident example’ says Bilgrami instead of condescending principles, but while the first option renders confident weak, the second renders the example useless. And so, by virtue of this fact, he fails to maintain the distinction which he wanted to maintain, which I think it is necessary to maintain. The problem is that it springs from the false basis of moral sense which has been assumed from antiquity to contemporary society i.e. ‘When one chooses for oneself, one chooses for everyone.’ A correction for Bilgrami would entail then a distinction between an action and moral action. This lies in the subsequent question where does morality spring from? Why are we moral? We are moral beings because we are rational being, some might say (in fact some do say). But how can we be moral being in so far morality is based on action and is reflected by actions and we have no idea where does moral conduct spring from. How can we be moral and not know what morality is? Is that why Socrates resorted to reduction ad absurdum in search for definitions of virtues and said that ‘I know that I do not know’ himself when questioned? If one has to believe in there being what Darwin calls a ‘struggle for existence’ which includes the interdependency of species and individuals to form a society, then within the society lies morality too, and so there has to be a necessary struggle for the existence of morality. The struggle for existence though used in a large and metaphorical sense as Darwin confessed in ‘Struggle for Existence’[1], includes dependence of one being on the other, including not only the life of the individual but success in leaving progeny. However, it does form a basis of Darwin’s concept of Natural Selection. In so far as there is a necessity, a need to be good, for survival, one is in fact inherently selfish if moral and help is derogatory. We help others knowing that it would not be enough. I would like to believe, that in fact we help precisely because we know that it will not be enough. If it were, one would not help. Morality then seen from convention is inherently selfish. True ‘Moral sense’ might include in hopeless devotion, a useless unnecessary belief, a belief without an essence, without the principles, with an unconditionality. The agent is not an unconditional host then for being a host comes with conditions. The agent is an unconditional meddler or a trespasser, and trespassing, is not required for the other, it has no conditions and it can conform to the ‘un - conditionality’ condition and yet be an agent. The ground of this unconditional meddler lies in moral ambiguity, which can only be cleared if one succeeds to answer: ‘Where does Morality or moral conduct (as opposed to mere conduct) spring from?’ I do not think that this question has been answered. This is not to say that it will never be answered or that it can’t. It just happens to be the case that, it hasn’t been answered. Is looking for an answer as futile as hoping someone to find the message in the bottle out in the ocean? What's the 'message' in the bottle behind the act of putting it in the ocean? Is there any?

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[1] Chapter 3, Origin of Species(1859), Charles Darwin, Buntan Books, reprint 1999, pg 54